In Defense of Direct Perception Essay -- Philosophy Philosophical Essa

In Defense of Direct Perception ABSTRACT: My goal in this paper is to defend the claim that one can directly perceive an object without possessing any descriptive beliefs about this object. My strategy in defending this claim is to rebut three arguments that attack my view of direct perception. According to these arguments, the notion of direct perception as I construe it is objectionable since: (1) it is epistemically worthless since it leaves perceived objects uninterpreted; (2) it cannot explain how perceived objects are identified; and (3) it is ill-prepared to assign objective content to perceptual states. What is involved in the claim that one directly perceives an object? The notion of direct perception that I propose to defend in this paper is this: that one 'directly' perceives an object if one's perception of this object is not mediated by beliefs. Put another way, a 'direct' perceiver does not believe anything about an object in (directly) perceiving it. On this construal of the notion of direct perception, it follows that if one directly perceives an object, one does not describe this object; for any description of an object is expressed as a belief, and direct perceptions do not involve beliefs. The direct perceiver, I claim, does not (and indeed may be completely unable to) give a description of the perceived object, without this lack (or inability) detracting from the fact that the object is directly perceived. In defending this view of direct perception, we need to become clearer on how it is possible for a belief to mediate one's perception of an object. There are (at least) two ways in which this can occur. Here's the first. A belief can be said to mediate one's perception of an object if a belief se... ...ld, itself, be an interpretation—but then we've simply displaced the problem one step, for the question will arise again with this interpretation, to wit, what is its object. Nor could the object of an interpretation simply be what satisfies the interpretation (or, put another way, whatever satisfies the descriptive beliefs associated with a perception) for an object could satisfy this interpretation, without being the de facto object of perception. Indeed, an object of indirect perception might not, in actuality, even satisfy one's associated descriptive beliefs—and still it will be indirectly perceived. Thus, the object of an indirect perception must be what is provided by a direct perception—what other object could be a candidate? That is, the notion of an indirect perception relies on a prior notion of a direct perception, and is indeed inconceivable without it.